Approved For Release 2000/08/29 CIA-RAR79\$01011A001000020009-8

SECURITY INFORMATION

31 March 1953:

MEMORANDUM FOR: DD/P

SUBJECT:

DCI's Remarks to the Ad Hoc Committee on NSC 143

- 1. Pending the preparation on issuance of the formal minutes, this is a special report on DCI's remarks to the Ad Hoc Committee at its meeting yesterday 30 March.
- 2. Mr. Dulles was introduced by Chairman Crittenberger who said that the Committee desired to get a general estimate from the Director of Central Intelligence of the value and feasibility of the proposal to establish a Volunteer Freedom Corps. In his introductory remarks Mr. Dulles made the following points:
 - a. Like many ventures of this nature, it will be good if it works. It appears to have a fair chance of working out, but success is not assured. Much of its success will depend on the nature of the publicity accompanying the launching of the program. Premature publicity will be very dangerous.
 - b. From the CIA point of view, the VFC is interesting on two counts: (1) In the psychological affect if could have on promoting defection and, (2) In its effect in building hope and morale within the Iron Curtain countries. Both these objectives are very important. Greater defection is important for Intelligence particularly with respect to obtaining higher level defectors.

 The building of marale within the countries is important from several "activist" points of view. For these reasons VFC has

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
- c. From the practical point of view the VFC could provide a screening device for both the intelligence and the activist fields. Careful surveillance and military training under U.S. trainers should serve to bring out some of the more valuable elements among the escapees.
- d. A careful estimate needs to be made of the numbers of escapees available. The various existing estimates indicate that the total number would be no more than 30,000 and that thus a modest beginning of the type envisaged by the Committee will be required.
- e. After these few general remarks DCI was asked a number of questions essentially as follows:

General Crittenberger: Have you had any experience in CIA in utilizing enlistees under the Lodge Act?

precise information at this moment (Mr. Dulles then asked me to ascertain the facts which I did today and have reported them to Mr. Dulles. His impression that we had not so utilized Lodge Act enlistees is confirmed by my review and the feeling of all concerned is that we did not seek to utilize these young men because of the security hazard inherent in the way that they were recruited and trained, plus the fact that this program offered an obvious target for the opposition).

General Crittenberger: What is your opinion as to why more young men were not attracted by the Lodge Act?

DCI: Young men ink in the USSR haven't known what liberty is, so the appeal, if it ever got to their ears at all, produced no



response in the Satellites there has been a substantial amount of defection among young men and some of them did get through to join up under the Lodge Act, but in the meantime the opposition has tightened up controls very rigidly.

Mr. Marshall: Do you visualize recruiting for covert use quite separately from the overt military use of the VFC?


DCI: This would, of course, have to be exercised with the utmost care. We might be able to divert some of the personnel for covert use before entering the Corps. Once they have become members of the Corps, we would feel that they had lost their value for covert use. We have to assume Communist infiltration of anything like the VFC.

Mr. Marshall: This Committee has contemplated writing a preamble to the proposed draft legislation which would state among the objectives of the VFC that ix it is organized to uphold the principles of the UN Charter. Do you agree with this?

DCI: (Replied in general that the best psychological affect of a VFC would be the statement of its purpose as being in support of universal principles of freedom and that of course the UN Charter could be included in this context.)

General Ruffner: Ambassador Lodge stated to this Committee that our escapee programs are "getting under the skins" of the Russians. Do you believe the VFC would be an aid to advancing the escapee program?

DCI: The VFC should definitely be an aid to defection particularly among Czechs and Poles, but less among the Hungarians





and Rumanians because they have no common border with the West.

General Ruffner: In previous Committee meetings it has been suggested that the setting up of efficient defector reception centers would be one of the most important elements in carrying out the program. Do you have any comment?

DDI: I certainly agree that we must assure that defectors are made to feel welcome. We must also be sure that not only those who are accepted for service in the VFC but also those who are rejected be taken care of adequately (at this point DCI also suggested that it might be very helpful if escapees who have families behind the Iron Curtain be given pseudonyms at the time they are recruited.

Mr. Edmund Taylor: Do you believe the VFC program should be extended to the Far Eastern Soviet areas?

DCI: Haven't had a chance to give this much thought. Where would they come from? Some might show up in Turkey such as Georgians and Armenians, but this is a rather special question.

- f. Mr. Dulles was then asked by the Chairman if he had any preliminary estimate of the probable Soviet reaction to a VFC.

 Mr. Dulles then proceeded to give the substance of the rough preliminary estimate made by the ONE Staff for review by the IAC at its meeting next week. This preliminary report will be included in the formal minutes of the meeting which will be sent you subsequently.
- g. In response to a question from Mr. Marshall as to whether the VFC would be applicable to all countries behind the Curtain





in Eastern Europe, Mr. Dulles replied that he had no firm conviction of his own, but that the problem should be looked at from the point of view of three geographic areas: (1) the Satellites, (2) the Baltic Countries, and (3) The Ukranians and other nationalities which have been considered a part of the USSR. In general, it may be said that DCI's remarks were looked upon as cautious but encouraging and mt in any event as highly enlightening.

